LEGAL REMEDIES FOR "CLOUD-SEEDING" ACTIVITIES:
NUISANCE OR TRESPASS?
THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONof liability for "cloud-seeding" has been
decided at the appellate-court level for the first time.' The decision,
Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Duncan,2 attaims added significance
in that it delineates the landowner's rights in the rain clouds above his
land and circumscribes the applicable remedy.
In this case the defendants3 "seeded" clouds4 over and in the vicinity
of the plaintiffs' pfoperty to prevent hail storms. The plaintiffs filed a
bill to enjoin this activity, alleging that it resulted in decreased rainfall
over their land. The trial court, after hearing witnesses 5 testify that
they had observed the dissipation of rain clouds following the "seeding," temporarily enjoined the activity in the vicinity of plaintiffs'
property. The appellate court airmed the decision,6 but modified the
injunction to prohibit weather modification only in the area directly
above plaintiffs' land.7
'There have been five previous cases involving weather modification: Reeve v.
O'Dwyer, 199 Misc. 123, 98 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Sup. Ct. x95o); Slutsky v. City of New
York, 197 Misc. 730, 97 N.Y.S.zd 238 (Sup. Ct. i95o) Samples v. Irving P. Krick,
Inc, Civil Nos. 62x2, 6223, 6224 (W.D. Okla. 1954)5 Anvil Orchards v. Weather
Modification, Inc., No. 4o544 (Super. Ct. Wash. 1956). These cases were disposed of
in the trial courts, while Avery v. ODwyer, 305 N.Y. 658, ixz N.E.2d 428 (953),
the only one to reach an appellate court, turned on a procedural point. It is now back
on the court docket.
2319 S.W.zd 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), a'd, 327 S.W.zd 417 (Tex. x959).
This case was heard jointly with Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones by the
Texas Supreme Court, which held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in
either case by granting the temporary injunctions. The opinion pertained principally
to questions of jurisdiction and procedure. The cases had been heard jointly at the
trial level and were appealed separately to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Jones case
was know in the two lower courts as Southwest Weather Research, Inc. V. Rounsavflle.
"The defendants in this case included farmers whose lands lay east of the seeding
activities and the parties they hired to "seed" the clouds.
' The method used by the defendants is commonly known as "over-seeding," and
involves the use of silver iodide and salt brine. The effect can be to form so many ice
crystals that the droplets of moisture in the clouds never attain a size large enough to
fall out and cause rain.
'Besides eyewitnesses, both sides presented expert witnesses to support or contradict
the proposition that the "over-seeding" would decrease precipitation.
*The court held that there was ample evidence on which to base the finding that
the defendants' activities dissipated potential rain clouds.
'Because the plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, the perplexing problem of
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The court's holding that the plaintiffs have rights in the water in the
clouds is based on the common-law doctrine of natural rights.8 The
landowner is said to have the right to the reasonable use and enjoyment
of his land in its natural condition, free from the interference of others.
The activities of the defendants, in depriving' the plaintiffs of the
natural amount of rainfall, violated one of their natural rights and gave
them a right of action in equity.10
Legal writers,11 speculating on the problem of liability for "cloudseeding," have analogized the problem to the doctrine of riparian rights,
which holds that no one has the right so to divert the waters of a stream
as to interfere unreasonably with its use by lower riparian landowners.1"
damages was not encountered. This problem would be even more difficult in an action
for damages due to increased precipitation. It would then be necessary to determine
what part of the excessive precipation was caused by the cloud-seeding.
8 United States v. Causby, 328 U.s. 256 (1946); Hinman v. Pacific Air Transp.,
84. F.2d 755 (9 th Cir. 1936) j Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 2o (6th
Cir. 1932); Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.ad 497 (1952); City of St.
Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, 22 S.W. 861 (1893); Lower Colo. R. Authority v. Camp
Warnecke, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). "The principal natural
rights are (i) riparian rights; (2) the right to support of land, both lateral and sub.adjacent; (3) the right to natural diffusion of the air, reasonably free from dust, smoke,
or other pollution; (4) the right to natural drainage of the land; and (5) the right to
use the land for any reasonable purpose . . . ."

Comment,

1

STAN. L. RMV. 43,

52

(1948).
'Anything which interferes with such use and enjoyment in turn destroys the property itself. See Lakeside Irr. Co. v. Markham Irr. Co., x6 Tex. 65, 285 S.W. 593
(x926); Spann v. City of Dallas, III Tex. 350,2 35 S.W. S13 (1921).
0

" The doctrine of strict liability, based possibly on the. theory of ultrahazardous

activity, as advocated in Comment, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 262 (1951), was not applied by

the court.
" This problem has been the subject of speculation in numerous articles. See Ball,
Shaping the Law of Weather Control, 58 YALE L.J. 213 (1949)3 Grauer & Erickson,
The Weathermaker and the Law, i S.D.L. REV. 1o5 (1956); Oppenheimer, The Legal
4spects of Weather Modification, 1958 INS. L. J. 314; Stark, Weather Modification:
Water-Three Cents Per Acre-Foot?, 45 CALIF. L. Rav. 698 (1957) ; Weibel, Problems
of Federalismin the .4ir Ago--Part 1, 24 J. AIR L. & CoM. 127 (1957) 5 Comments,
37 CALIF. L. Rav. x4 (r94 9 ) ; I CATH. U.L. REV. 122 (1951) S 34 MAt.Q. L. REV.
262 (1951); 1 STAN. L. REV. 43 (1948); I STAN. L. REV. 508 (1949)1 Notes, 29
CmI.-KENT L. Ray. 150 (1951); 39 Gao. L.J. 466 (1951); 4 VAND. L. Ra,. 332
(1951).

"See Robertson v. Arnold, 182 Ga. 664, x86 S.E. 8o6 (1936); McEvoy v. Gallagher, 107 Wis. 331, 83 N.W. 633 (i9oo); See also, Indianapolis Water Co. v. Amern.'
can Strawboard Co., 57 Fed. iooo (D. Ind. 1893); Mayor of Paterson v. East Jersey
Water Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 49, 70 Atl. 472 (Ch. 19o8); Weiss v. Oregon Iron & Steel Co.,
13 Ore. 496, 1 Pac. 255 (1886); Lower Colo. R. Authority v. Camp Warnecke, Inc.,
267 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Chasemore v. Richards, xx Eng. Rep. 140

(Ex. 1859).
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Conceivably, this may become the basis for rights to rainwater in those
states which recognize riparian rights."3 It is interesting to note, however, that the Texas court did not resort to any such analogy, but chose
to base its decision on the general doctrine of natural rights.
While the opinion does not discuss trespass and nuisance as bases for
relief, it is believed that other courts, when faced with a problem of this
type, will find it necessary to determine whether the invasion constitutes
trespass or nuisance, or both. The knotty problem of ownership of the
airspace becomes important here if a court limits relief to that of an
action for trespass. This issue is far from settled. One theory, accepted
by the Restatement of Torts, 4 holds that the landowner owns the entire
airspace above his land, subject to the privileged entry of aircraft.
According to this concept, an unreasonable entry is a trespass. 5 It is
believed that this theory is patently absurd. 6 To base future decisions
pertaining to weather modification on a legal fiction adopted in the sixteenth century is inviting chaos. Unfortunately, many courts, when
initially confronted with a case of this type, may fall into the trespass
7
abyss.'
A second line of authority, which commands substantial support,
"'In the nine Western states which repudiate riparian water rights, however, the outcome on a question concerning rain water might be analogously unfavorable to a landowner. The states are Arizona, Colorado,'Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Utah, and Wyoming. Riparian rights are recognized as to private land, but
appropriation rights apply to public lands in California, Kansas, Nebraska, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington. See Comment, I STAN. L.
REV. 43 (1948).
""An entry above the surface of the earth, in the air space in the possession of
another, by a person who is traveling in an aircraft, is privileged if the flight is conducted (a) for the purpose of travel through the air space or for any other legitimate
purpose, (b) in a reasonable manner, (c) at such a height as not to interfere unreasonably with the possessor's enjoyment of the surface of the earth and the air space above

it, and (d) in conformity with such regulations of the State and federal aeronautical
authorities as are in force in the particular State." RESTATEMENT, ToRTS § 194 (1934).
" Guith v. Consumers Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Mich. 1940), United
States v. One Pitcairn Biplane, 11 F. Supp. 24. (W.D. N.Y. 1935)
Amphitheaters,
Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P.2d 847 (x948); Crew v. Gallagher,
358 Pa. 54I, 58 A.2d 179 (7948).
"The compromise solution of granting a privilege of reasonable entry does little
to eradicate the inherent absurdity of this theory, and only builds on an already faulty
structure.
7
" This may be especially true in those states which have adopted the position of the

Restatxet

on airspace ownership: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware,

Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New

Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

['Vol. i96o: 305

holds that the landowner owns up to a limited height1 8 and that the
upper atmosphere is public domain. 19 In some of these jurisdictions an
unwarranted entry in the lower atmosphere constitutes a trespass, 20 while
in others it is a nuisance." When the entry occurs in the upper atmos22
phere, an action for nuisance is the only possible remedy.
In application 23 the label attached to the wrong may be of vital
consequence. A trespass action is limited, by definition, to wrongful
entry in the area above the plaintiff's land, while an action based on
1"

In the cases accepting the limited-ownership doctrine, "how far up" varies from

case to case and state to state. It may be broadly based upon the amount of airspace
essential to the reasonable use and enjoyment of the land, or only to the extent of actual
occupancy, or, more specifically, at an established minimum height (often that of the
Civil Aeronautics Board). The nuisance theory, which is finding considerable support,
circumvents this problem by restricting all such actions to that of nuisance. At present,

however, none of these theories are prevailing, and the courts often fail to distinguish
between them.
19

For cases holding that the upper atmosphere is public domain, see United States

v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 41 F.2d 929
(N.D. Ohio 1930); City of Newark v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J.

1958); Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958); Scott v. Dudley, 714 Ga. 565, 105 S.E.zd 752 (1958); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, ao
S.E.zd 245 (194z)i Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 321 Mass. 678, 42 N.E.2d 575
(i942); Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E.zd 752 (1947); Yoffee
v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 52o, 123 A.ad 636 (1956); Maitland v.
Twin City Av. Corp., 254 Wis. 541, 37 N.W.zd 74 (949).
2" United States v. Causby, sutra note i9; Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp.
977 (W.D.N.Y. i936); Burnham v. Beverly Airways, suara note x9; Smith v. New

England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 17o N.E. 385 (1930). Trespass here is actionable upon an intentional, negligent, or ultrahazardous entry and does not have the further qualification of having to be an "unreasonable interference" as does the Restatement
concerning entry through the airspace. See note 14 supra.
"Brandes v. Mitterling, 67 Ariz. 349, 196 P.2d 464 (1948); Anderson v. Souza,
38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (2952); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 2o
S.E.2d 245 (1942); Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934);
Warren Township Sch. Dist. v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N.W.2d 134 (1944);

Hyde v. Somerset Air Serv., i N.J. Super. 346, 61 A.2d 645 (Ch. 1948).
" "The actor is liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if, (a) the other has property
rights and privileges in respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; and (b) the
invasion is substantial; and (c) the actor's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
(d) the invason is either (i) intentional and unreasonable; or (ii) unintentional and
otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct." RESTATEMENT, TOvrs § 8.z (1939).
"' The difference in theory between relief based upon trespass and nuisance is not
substantial, as the unlimited-ownership theory allows relief for an entry that constitutes
"unreasonable interference," while the position of the Restatement on nuisance permits
recovery when there is a "substantial invasion." To distinguish between the two phrases
seems somewhat difficult.
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nuisance is not so restricted 24 and affords more complete protection.
Though there is no reason why a court might not provide relief under
both the trespass and nuisance actions, it is feared that a court adopting
the Restatement's theory of unlimited ownership would tend to restrict
itself to relief based on trespass. The opinion in the Duncan case briefly
reviews the question of airspace ownership without reaching any definitive conclusions on the issue. While the court seems to suggest that
relief may be given irrespective of the ultimate answer to this somewhat
theoretical problem, 25 yet, in modifying the injunction to prohibit cdoudseeding" only in the area directly above the plaintiffs' property, the
court in fact limited itself to the trespass theory. The court failed to
give the plaintiffs the full protection to which they were entitled. 6
While the intermediate court seems to limit relief to that based on
trespass, the Texas Supreme Court, in affirming, indicates that the modification was necessary under the circumstances2 7 It is believed that the
problem of proof of causal relationship, coupled with the unique nature
of the action, played a significant role in the final outcome of the case.
Further proceedings in this case and subsequent actions involving weather
modification must provide answers to many issues left unsettled by this
decision. In any event, this court has established sound precedent by
holding that landowners are entitled to legal protection from "cloudseeding" which constitutes an unreasonable interference with their right
to natural precipitation.
Aside from this, the difficulty of proving the actual trespass (i.e., the plane's being
directly above the plaintiff's land) could prevent relief though substantial injury was
shown.
25 Writers have attempted to classify the cases dealing with the ownership of airspace. See i HARPER & JAMEs, TORTs 45 (1956)i PROSSER, ToRTS 59-61 (2d ed.
1955); Weibel, supra note ii.
.-According to the Supreme Court of Texas, such injunctions are issued to protect
the status quo. Unfortunately, such a limited injunction does not fully protect the status
quo because the plaintiff's right to the natural amount of rainfall might still be thwarted
by "seeding" clouds over nearby land.
27 Southwest Weather Research, Inc. v. Jones, 327 S.W.zd 47,
421-2Z (Tex. 1959).

